Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1977

Marion W. Beckstrom v. Vere Beckstrom and
Norman Laub : Reply Brief of Cross Defendants
and Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
J. MacArthur Wright; Attorney for Appellant;
J. MacArthur Wright; Attorney for Appellant;
Morris & Bishop; Attorneys for Appellant;
Allen, Thompson, Hughes & Behle; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, No. 15273 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/687

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREHE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARION H. BECKSTROM,

)
)

/

Plaintiff and Respondant, )

vs.
VERE BECKSTROM and NORMAN LAUB,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants and Appellant. )
_____________________________)
)
NORl1AtlD D. LAUB and BARBARA R. LAUB,)

Case No. 15273

)

Cross Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
VS.

VERE BECKSTROM and ELIZABETH S.
BECKSTROM,
Cross Defendants and
Respondants.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDANTS
Appeal from the Judgment of the 5th
District Court for \vashington County,
Hon. Don V. Tibbs, Judge
J. MacArthur
75 North 100
P.O. Box 339
St. George,
Attorney for
Respondants

Wright
East
Utah 84770
Cross Defendants and

Morris & Bishop
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorneys for Cross Plaintiffs
and Appellants
Allen, Thompson, Hughes and Behle
148 East Tabernacle
St. Cl2orge, Utah 84770
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondan t

F I LED
sr- P 1 :j

1977

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA'l'E OF UTAH
MARION IJ. BECKSTROM,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondant, )
vs.
VERE BECKSTROM and NORMAll LAUB,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants and Appellant. )
________________________________
)
)

NORMAND D. LAUB and BARBARA R. LAUB,)
Cross Plaintiffs and
Appellants ,

Case No. 15273

)
)

)
)
)
)

vs.
VERE BECKSTROM and ELIZABETH S.
BECKSTROM,
Cross Defendants and
Respondants.

)
)
)

)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDANTS
Appeal from the Judgment of the 5th
District Court for Hashington County,
lion. Don V. Tibbs, Judge
J. MacArthur Hright
75 North 100 East
P.O. Box 339
St. George, Utah 84770
Attorney for Cross Defendants and
Respondan ts
f1orris & Bishop
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorneys for Cross Plaintiffs
and Appellants
Allen, Thompson, Hughes & Behle
143 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 8!+770
Attornevs for Plaintiff and
Rcspo~<ian L

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Reply to Cross Plaintiffs and Appellants:
POINT I .•.. "

0

0

••

0

••

0

••••••••••••

0

••••••

0

•••

o

:~re

POINT II. o o o .•.•••••••• o ...•••••..•••••.•••••• 5
POINT IIIoo••••o•o••••••••••••o•·············l2
POINT IV. o o . o. o •• o •••••.•••

0

•••••••••••••••

0

•

13

CONCLUSION .• o o••••••••.••• o•••..••.•••••••••• 13
CASES CITED
Andreason vs. Hansen, 335 P2d 404, 8 Utah 2d 370 •••••••. 6
Bunnell vs. Bills, 368 P2d 597, 13 Utah 2d 83 ••••••••••• 6
Crompton vso Jensen, 78 Utah 55, 1 P2d 242 •••••••••••••• 2
Davis vs. Kleindienst, 169 P2d 78, Arizona •..••••••••••• 2
Hayes vs

0

Gibbs, llO Utah 54, 169 P2d 781. .............. 2

Leavitt vs. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P2d 190 •••••••••• 1
Marlowe Investment Corporation vs. Radmall,
2fi Utah 2d 124, 485 P2d 1402 ....•.•...•••.••.••.•••••. 1
Horgan vs. Bell, 3 Hash. 554, 28 P 925 .................. 8
Naylor vs. Jolley,

100 Utah 130, 111 P2d 142 ••••••••••• 1

Hoodard vso Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P2d 398o•••o••••••l
AUTHORITIES CITED
Utah Code Annotated 57-1-6 •••..

0

0

•••••••••••••••••

•·•

••••

2

20 Am" Jur. 2nd 65, Costs ~78 •••••••.••..•.....•.•.••••• 12
77 Am. Jur" 2nd 648, Vendor and Purchaser !!519 ....•.•••. 6
77 Am. Jur. 2nd 648, Vendor and Purchaser §522 .......... 6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cross Defendants and Respondants, VERE BECKSTROM
and ELIZABETH S. RECKSTROM, hereinafter referred to as "VERE
BECKSTROH", reply to the points of Cross Plaintiffs and
Appellants, hereinafter referred to as "LAUB" as follows:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RULING TiiA~ DEFENDANT, CROSS PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLANT NORMAND Do LAUB HAD A DUTY
TO INVESTIGATE THE STATUS OF TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY, AND THAT HE BREACHED A DUTY IN
NOT so DOINGO
Though the Cross Plaintiffs and Appellants believe
they had no obligation to investigate the status of the
title of the property purchased from VERE BECKSTROM, the
Court IE low ruled that they were sufficiently negligent in
failing to do so to justify a mitigation of the damages
av;arded to

them"
In claiming that the trial court erred, LAUB cites

Marlowe Investment Corporation vso Radrnall, Leavitt vso
Blohm, Hoodard vs

0

Allen and Naylor vs

0

Jolley, all of which

address themselves to the proposition that a vendor need not
necessarily have a good and clear title at the time the
contract of sale is made but rather, it is only necessary
at the time provided for conveyance under the contract.
VERE BECKSTROM does not argue the validity of
that

principal of law"

However, VERE BECKSTROM does submit

that LAUB has confused the issue that is actually involved.
The Court below did not address itself to the time that
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VERE BECKSTROM is obligated to deliver clear title, but
rather to the negligence of LAUB in failing to determine
under the facts of this case, that, at the very least, there
was another claimant of an interest in the property, one
other than VERE BECKSTROMo
Section 57-l-6 of the Utah Code Annotated provides
for the recordation of instruments of conveyance in the
County Recorder's office of the county in which the property
is situated.
Crompton vso Jenson,

78 U 55, l P2d 242, provides

that one who deals with real property is charged

~.;rith

notice

of what is shown by the records of the County Recorder of the
county in which the property is situated.

Hayes vs. Gibbs, llO U 54, 169 P2d 781, in discussi
restrictive covenants appearing of record in the Recorder's
office, quotes 66 CoJ. P 1128 §962, which states:
"A purchaser of land is chargeable ~vith notice
of all conditions, restrictions, exceptions,
or reservations appearing in his claim of
title, or concerning which he is put on
inquiry. '~''<o~"
In Davis vs. Kleindienst, 169 P2d 78, an Arizona
case, the Court, on page 83, says:
"The law seems to be settled that a person
who fails to exercise due diligence which
is within his reach is not a bona fide
purchaser."
In the Davis case, Supra, after noting that the
record showed numerous acts of obvious ownership, then added
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" .. "were all matters which at least were
sufficient to put the Defendant upon notice
to make an inquiry" Any reasonable inquiry
would have resulted in the disclosure that
Plaintiff claimed the tract in question.
(Ernphas~s Added)
LAUE may argue that the recording statutes are

only to protect the purchaser against third parties and not
from the error or mistake, or even dishonesty of a vendor.
However, the cases all indicate that a recorded interest
is

notice to all people of, at least a claim and under the

circumstances of the instant case, it appears that it would
be carelessness, at least, and probably outright negligence
for LAUE, being charged with notice of HARION BECKSTROM's
claims,

(by virtue of his being shown in the Recorder's

office as a joint owner of the property with VERE BECKSTROM
tir" 7, 118-l~ ) not to have made inquiry of MARION BECKSTROH
as to 'lhether he in fact claimed an interest in the property.
LAUB was well aware that MARION had occupied and farmed the
property for an extended period of time (Tr. 80, 1125-28)
and that knowledge together with the imputed knowledge that
MARIO!l

!ECKSTROM was shown as a tenant in common with VERE

BECKSTROM, by virtue of the record, should have caused him
to make an inquiry.
1AUB may no doubt insist that, as mentioned before,
such imputed knowledge only protects HARION BECKSTROM from
losinr, his interest by VERE BECKSTR011' s purported sale to
LALJR

Ps indicated in Appellant's Brief, VERE BECKSTROM
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felt MARION BECKSTROM had abandoned his interest and by
his acts would be estopped from assertinp, any claim to the
property so that he, VERE BECKSTROM, was perfectly free to
sell the property to LAUB.
rules

Hmvever, assuming the Court

.:gainst VERE BECKSTROl1 on that issue, then VERE

BECKSTROM was wrong and he could not convey at least onehalf of the property to LAUB.
It would appear only logical, reasonable and
equitable that LAUB had some responsibility to determine,
when the record showed MARION a tenant in common with VERE,
that

that may well be the case; and make any inquiry of both

MARION and VERE.

If, after that inquiry he determined to

gamble upon VERE being correct in his assumption that t1ARION
no longer had a legal or equitable interest in the property,
he would have done so with full understandinp, of the risk
he was taking.
The cases say LAUB is charged with knowledge of
the status of the recorded title and if he did not inquire
of the record, or make an investigation of the circumstance
surrounding the information found in the record, he must
suffer the consequences.
In the situation of the instant case, Cross Defendat
and !ppellants, VERE and ELIZABETH BECKSTROM, submit that eve
though they believed the trial court to have been in error ir
not finding that the factor of an equitable estoppel existed
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against !1ARION BECKSTROM's claim, they do sincerely submit
that the trial court did not err in finding, under the
circumstances, that LAUB had a duty to make an inquiry
into the status of the title (especially in view of the
status of the record title and LAUE's own personal knowledge
of the circumstances of the property in question) and that
having failed to do so is prohibitive to him from entitlement
to the unreasonable and

almost confiscatory claim against

VERE BECKSTROl1 which he makes

in

demanding that, not only

should VERE BECKSTROM forfeit any interest in the property,
but pay LAUB damages in an amount in excess of $19,000.00.
POINT II
TilE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER HEASURE OF
DA!1AGES AND FAILED TO AWARD TO APPELLANTS
LAUB, DA!1AGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $19,767.13.
LAUB argues in his Brief that because the property
in question has had an amazing record of appreciation in
value from $20,000.00 in December, 1972 (Tr. 96, LL23-26)
to $70,000.00 in March, 1977 (Tr. 97, LL20-28) he should be
entitled to one-half of the current market value of the
property in damages against VERE BECKSTROM if VERE BECKSTROM
cannot deliver title to the entire parcel.
total damages

That amounts to

to VERE BECKSTROM of loss of one-half of the

property to HARION BECKSTROl1, and loss of. the other half
to LAUE plus the sum of $35,100.00, or over $15,000.00 more
than LAUB contracted to pay VERE BECKSTR0!1 just 5 years ago
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for all of the property.
LAUB cites B1.llmell vs. Bills, 368 P2d 597, 13 Utah
2d 83,

md Andreason vs. Hansen, 335 P2d 4011, 8 Utah 2d 370,

as the

law in Utah--the point being that the purchaser is

entitled to the "benefit of his bargain".
Certainly the Bunnell case Supra and the Andreason
case Supra would seem to suggest that to be the law in Utah,
77 Am Jur 2d 648, Vendor and Purchaser ~519, as citE

by LAUB states the principal as follows:
" ••• these statements are substantiallY the
same in effect and resultes in giving" the
purchaser as damages ·the benefit of his
bargain, in case the land is worth more
than the price agreed upon."
However, Am Jur qualifies that somewhat by continuir.
"This is very generally recognized where
the vendor cannot be said to have acted in
good faith, as where, after the making of
the contract disables himself by his own
act or neglect from being able to convey,
or where, having the ability to do so, he
refuses to convey because of an advance
in the value of the land or otherwise,
or where he had knowledge of his want of
or the defects in his title. Hhen, however,
the vendor has acted in good faith but is
unable to carry out the contract because
of some defect in the title. recover¥ b¥
the purchaser for loss of his bargaln lS
denied by the weight of authority."
(Emphasis Added)
Section 522 of the same treatise expounds upon that
theme as follows:
"in many jurisdiction, when the vendor
is unable to convey, a distinction is
made regarding the general damages
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The Bunnell case, Supra says, pertaining to the
issue of damages, merely,
"The measure of damages where the vendor
has breached a land sale contract is the
market value of the property at the time
of the breach less the contract price to
the vendee."
Nothing more is said concerning the theory
that pronouncement.

of

No analysis of the rationale of that

determination is made.

Nothing is said in the case about

whether that pricipal is hard and fast or whether it applies
only where the vendor did not act in good faith.
the

However,

facts, in that case, were such that would certainly

have justified the Court in finding that the vendor did not
act in good faith and the Court's decision might well be
assumed to have been predicated upon that circumstance
even though it did not enunciate a distinction based upon
bad faith of the

vendor in the body of its opinion.

The Bunnell case merely cited for authority the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Andreason case, Supra,

However, even though the Andreason

case did say,
The proper measure of damages vwuld be the
difference between the Defendant's offer
and the actual market value of the property,.,"
it was

done without citation of authority or analysis of

any kind.

Nevertheless, the Court, in that case, did spend

much of its written opinion

discussin~

improprieties on the

part of the vendor and finally decided the case, actually,
upon the

narrow issue of liquidated damages.
VERE BECKSTROM respectfully submits that neither

the Bunnell nor the Andreason cases, Supra stand solidly
for the principal that regardless of the

circ~stances

the

purchaser is entitled to the "benefit of his bargain" in
Utah.

Rather, it is respectfully submitted that the precise

issue of whether the

~inciple

applies only when the vendor

acts in bad faith is still open in Utah,
Assuming that issue is open, the instant case wou!C
seem to provide an excellent example why the law should make
a distinction between the situation where a vendor acts in
bad faith and where he acts in good faith.
An early Washington State case, Morgan vs, Bell,

3 \lash. 554, 28 P 925, provides an excellent analysis,
commencing on page 932, of the arguments pro and con and
concludes the better rule is that one who acts in good faith
is entitled to a mitigation of damages as opposed to a vend~

",
'

'
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1vho does not act in good faitho
On page 933, the Court notes, after referring to
several cases:
"In these cases the line has been repeatedly
drawn between parties acting in good faith,
and failing to perform because they could
not make a title, and parties Hhose conduct
is tainted with fraud or bad faith,"
After a fairly lengthy discussion of the cases, the
Court illustrated why it adopted the rule that it did:
"The case at bar aptly illustrates the
injustice which the eminent Justice sought
to prevent,
If Plaintiff's allegations
are true, the contract was for sale of
lands which in December were worth $20,000,00
and m April following were worth $150,000.00;
and the result is that for the pitiful sum of
$500.00 the Defendant, who was acting in
perfect good faith, is called upon to yield
up $134,500.00 in response to Plaintiff's
investment of $500.00 for four months. If
such a rule were adopted in this western
country, where what is cheap agricultural
or farming land one year is valuable city
property the next and where the laws by reason
of the formative condition of the state, are
unsettled and unadjudicated, a conveyance of
land would be a perilous transaction, which
a prudent man might well hesitate to engage
in."
The same might be said about a time when inflation
causes rapid appreciation in land values or in which ever
increasing scarcity of water creates enormous increases in
value
have a

of otherwise valueless land which is lucky enough to

vater right appurtenant to it, as is the situation in

the instant case.
Though the situation is not quite as extreme in
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this case as the example provided in the Horgan case Supra,
nevertheless, it does point up a severe hardship that may be
imposed upon a vendor who cannot provide title at

fue time

provided for conveyance, if the Bunnell and Andreason cases
are interpreted to establish the law in Utah as disregarding
good faith on the part of the vendor in mitigation of damages.
The final point is, of course, necessarily that the
vendors, in this case, VERE BECKSTROl1 and ELIZABETH BECKSTRo:·,
must be found to have acted in good faith in selling to LAUB.
It is respectfully urged that regardless of the
outcome of the appeal in this case by VERE BECKSTROM from the
judgment below a1varded against him and to l1ARION BECKSTROI1,
VERE

BECKSTROM certainly did not act fraudulently or in sud.

patent bad faith as to justify the penalty that awaits him
if LAUB were to be successful in his appealo
To illustrate the good faith of VEPill BECKSTROM,
one would have to reiterate the entire appeal brief previous!:submitted by him dealing with the doctrine of equitable
estoppel and he does respectfully refer the Court to that

~~

Brief.
Suffice it to say that VERE BECKSTROl1, not being
educated in the niceties of the law, added up the many factor'
before him: his having paid almost the entire cost of the
land; his brother having abandoned it many years before;
VERE, himself, having paid all the taxes on it, both before
and

-

after l1ARION's abandonment of it; his having provided
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improvements (digging a new well, among others); VERE
having operated it for several years until his stroke
prevented him from doing so any longer after MARION abandoned it; his having thereafter taken the responsibility
of leasing it; MARION having earlier tried to get him to
sell it, simply to avoid losing it by foreclosure as vas
done with companion property obtained under similar
circumstances; and finally, MARION having refused to pay
additional taxes when due with knowledge of what the possible
consequences of failure to pay them would be (Tr. 30, LLl0-13)
and at least, according to VERE; saying "Let the state
take it for taxes".

All of these factors led VERE to believe,

rightly or wrongly, that he was at that time the sole owner
of the property and had every right to sell the property and
convey good title to it to LAUB.
If VERE BECKSTROM was wrong, he will be advised by
this Court he was wrong, depending upon the results of his
appeal against the judgment awarded below to !>ARION BECKSTROM,
but even if that be the result, it hardly seems a case where
one might say his act of selling the property in question to
LAUB was not done in good faith and that consequently not
only must he lose his investment in money, time and hard
effort which he has made in the property over many years, but
must also pay out of his pocket to LAUB an additional $19,767.13
in Hhat can only be characterized as punitive damages against
him,
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TI1is seems particularly true when, as the Court
below found, LAUB had a duty of inquiring and investigating
and thereby determining the status of the title,
It would be the best of two worlds if he could
say to himself, "I know there is another claimant of an
interest in the property, but I won't do anything about it
to protect myself.

If that claimant's interest turns out

to be valid, I'll at least get my money back plus interest
out of the: seller, but if the price should appreciate in
the rneanti,!1le, I'll get damages from him as well.

So I

can't lose'!"
··one should not be able to stand idly by, in the
::,

face of nqt;.;ice of a possible problem and make an exhorbitant

.,

profit out of that inaction.
POINT III
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
• COHMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY A\JARDING
~.PPELLANTS LAUB ONLY $500.00 FOR THE
~!~RVICES OF THEIR ATTORNEY.
LAUB argues that the Court below abused its discretion in a>varding the sum of $500.00 rather than $800.00
as

reques~ed

by him.

'~~

20 Am. Jur. 65, Costs ~78 states that:
"In the absence of an abuse of discretion,
the amount awarded by the trial court as
an attorney's fee will not be disturbed,---"
The Court below had the advantage of knowledge of
the

~ngth of the trial,

of observing counsel, reviewing th

pleadings ,j;d having an intimate understanding of tl1c s<·rvi
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accordingly.
VERE BECKSTROt1, in good faith, believed his brother

1vould

not claim the property - even that his brother, MARION,

in fact, had no legal right to an interest in the property
even if he did later claim an interest.

But in spite of

VERE BECKSTROM's judgment, LAUB certainly had some obligation
to determine whether or not that judgment was reliable.

He

should not simply sit back and benefit from VERE BECKSTROM's
mistake, if, indeed, it was a mistake, when he himself had
an opportunity and a duty to make his own inquiry and judgment.
The Cross Defendants submit that there was, at
least, sufficient obligation on LAUE's part to mitigate the
amount of damages if not sufficient to exonerate them entirely.
Furthermore, the Cross Defendants and Respondants
submit that the apparent holding of the Bunnell and Andreason
cases, Supra, should be clarified and refined to establish
the law in Utah to be that the vendor is entitled to "the
benefit of his bargain" only when the vendor acts in bad
faith, as has been expounded by many cases throughout the
nation on the subject.
Should the judgment against VERE BECKSTROM in
favor of MARION BECKSTROM be upheld by the Court, VERE BECKSTROM
then urges that this honorable court either reverse and award

LAUE only the refund of his money paid, plus interest or in the
alternative sustain the award handed down by the lower court
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rendered.

It could hardly be deemed, as a matter of

law, that the Court abused its discretion in awarding

$500.00 rather than $800000 under all the circumstances"
POINT IV
APPELLANTS LAUB ARE ENTITLED TO AN ORDER
OF THIS COURT AWARDING APPELLANTS ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEALO
As LAUB states, an award of an attorney's fee on
appeal is discretionaryo
Under the circumstances of this case, the multiple
appeals and the issues involved, it is respectfully submitted
that it would not be in the interest of justice to award an
attorney's fee on appeal to LAUB against the Cross Defendants,
VERE and ELIZABETH BECKSTROMo
CONCLUSION
Cross Defendants, VERE BECKSTR0!1 and ELIZABETH
BECKSTROM respectfully submit that--in view of his personal
knowledge and acquaintance '"ith both MARION BECKSTROH and
VERE BECKSTROM and in view of the constructive knowledge
of the fact that the record title in the County Recorder's
office showed MARION BECKSTROM to have a tenancy in common
interest in the property, and in view of the fact that it
is almost inconceivable that one in this day would obligate
himself under a contract to purchase real property without
making some nominal and traditional investigation into the
status of the title--that LAUB had a responsibility to deten:
what the record clearly shmved and to conuuct his affairs
,·

LY~

Iiiii"'"
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against VERE BECKSTROM
DATED this

in~vor

~day

of LAUB,
of September, 1977.

• MacARTHUR HRIGHT,

Attorney for Cross Defendants
and Respondan ts
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